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This paper analyzes the role of bank competition on the life-cycle dynamics of non-financial industries.
Using multi-dimensional data sets, which contain information on job creation and destruction for
establishments in U.S. manufacturing sectors operating in different geographical regions and over time, I
find evidence that bank competition accelerates the expansion of start-ups and helps them to thrive while
young. Once these establishments are mature, however, less competitive banking markets are more
propitious. Specifically, mature establishments expand at higher rates and exit the industry at a slower pace
in less competitive banking markets.
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Introduction
A theoretical debate has emerged recently on the role of bank competition for economic
activity in industrial sectors. In their seminal work on this issue, Petersen and Rajan
(1995) have argued that young and unknown firms have easier access to credit if banks
have market power. In their reasoning, banks with market power fund young firms with
the expectation that they will be capable of extracting future rents once those firms
become profitable. Petersen and Rajan’s argument has immediate implications for
predicting the role of bank competition on entry conditions in industrial sectors.
Following their goal of profit maximization, banks with market power should be
observed always to favor new entrants. This is because new entrants are potentially
endowed with higher return projects and more innovative technologies that would
guarantee ever increasing profit-sharing opportunities for the banks. Therefore, bank
market power should continuously foster industry entry.
There is empirical evidence providing support for this argument. In addition to the
aforementioned Petersen and Rajan (1995), Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia (Forthcoming)
show that growth rates in the number of new enterprises are higher in markets with
higher bank concentration. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), although not focusing on entry,
show that growth of industries where young firms are especially dependent on external
finance is disproportionately higher in countries with higher bank concentration. There is
also empirical evidence pointing in the opposite direction. Black and Strahan
(Forthcoming), for example, show that business starts are more numerous in U.S. states
after the relaxation of restrictions to entry in banking markets and also higher in markets
with lower bank concentration. Similar results are also found in Cetorelli (2001) and in
Cetorelli and Strahan (2002).3
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The lack of univocal evidence may indicate the existence of a more elaborate mechanism
through which bank competition affects economic activity in industrial sectors. The basic
argument in Petersen and Rajan relies on the formation of long-time lending relationships
and on the value that inheres to such relationships for the bank. The latter is represented
in their work by the present value of the future stream of profits of those firms the bank
originally helped start up, firms that eventually become the industry incumbents. A
possible theoretical “tension” embedded in this argument lies in the fact that the
profitability of the older bank clients (and thus the bank’s own profitability) will be
affected by the entry of new firms. The bank may therefore face a potential trade-off
between restricting access to credit of new entrants and continuing its ongoing
relationship with the industry incumbents on the one hand, and allowing credit access to
new firms, thus establishing new and possibly even more valuable relationships with
them  at the expense of the older clients, on the other. In recent papers, Cestone and
Lewis (Forthcoming) and Spagnolo (2002) have presented theoretical frameworks in
which existing lending relationships do indeed affect the behavior of lenders vis-à-vis
potential new borrowers. The less competitive the conditions in the credit market, the
lower the incentive for lenders to finance newcomers. Hence, financial market
competition can represent a form of barrier to entry in product markets.
1
What emerges from this discussion is that the effect of banking market structure and
competition may have heterogeneous effects across firms within an industrial sector.
More precisely, the effect may be different for start-ups and incumbents, thus implying
that bank competition may have an impact on the entire life-cycle dynamics of industrial
sectors, and not just on entry. More or less bank competition not only affects entry but
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also affects the likelihood that young firms will survive and expand after entry. In
keeping, once again, with the theoretical arguments illustrated above, more or less bank
competition will also have an impact on the ability of the more mature firms (the
incumbents) to prosper and eventually on the pace at which they will exit the industry.
This paper reflects a first attempt to examine the effect of bank competition on the life-
cycle dynamics of industrial sectors. More precisely, I measure the effect of bank
competition on the rates of job creation and destruction of U.S. manufacturing plants
belonging to different age groups. If bank market power enhances the access to credit of
young firms and accelerates exit of the more mature ones, then we should expect – all
else being equal – higher rates of job creation and/or lower rates of job destruction in
earlier years, and lower rates of job creation and higher rates of job destruction among the
older establishments. The opposite should be true if instead banks with market power
tend to maintain close ties with incumbent firms and to create a financial barrier to entry
in product markets.
The next section illustrates the data sets I have used for this study. Next, I describe the
methodology for identifying the effects of bank competition and present the results of the
empirical analysis. A summary of the results, highlighting caveats and unresolved issues,
is presented in the conclusion.
Data set
The empirical testing of these propositions calls for a data set with information on
industry dynamics, including specific details on the real activity of both start-ups and
mature firms. The Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) data set on job creation and
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destruction in U.S. manufacturing sectors is a good example of a data set with these
characteristics, one which to the best of my knowledge has yet to be used in order to
analyze the potential effects of credit market characteristics on the life-cycle dynamics of
industrial sectors.
This data set collects information on establishments’ rates of job creation and destruction
elaborated from the Longitudinal Research Database of the Census Bureau’s Center for
Economic Studies. The database contains information on individual U.S. manufacturing
plants with five or more employees, collected through the quinquennial Census of
Manufactures and the Annual Surveys of Manufactures. The publicly available version of
the data set, at its finest level of detail, contains information aggregated across
establishments belonging to the same two-digit SIC manufacturing sectors, across nine
census regions (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific), from 1973 to
1988.
2 Data is presented at this level of disaggregation on the rates of job creation and
destruction among both “start-ups” and “continuing” establishments. An establishment is
defined as a start-up in a given year if it shows up in the survey for the first time in that
year. An establishment is defined as a continuing one in a given year if it was already
present in the survey the previous year.
3 Note, however, that the rates of job creation for
the two age groups (start-ups and continuing establishments) are reported only as
components of the total rate of job creation.
4 In other words,
(1)    TB B C C
tt t t t g g empshare g empshare =⋅ +⋅
                                                          
2 An extension to 1993 is available publicly but for data at a higher level of aggregation, which makes it
non-interesting for the purposes of this study.
3 For complete classification criteria of start-ups and continuing establishments, see Davis, Haltiwanger and
Schuh (1996), Table A3, p. 202.
4 This comment does not apply to the rates of job destruction.6
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where  T
t g is total job creation rate,  B
t g is the growth rate for start-ups,  B
t empshare the
employment share of start-ups,  C
t g  the growth rate for continuing establishments and
C
t empshare their employment share. The data set contains information for the two products
on the right-hand side but not for the growth rates separately, nor does it contain
information on relative employment shares. Hence, the data on job creation for each of
the two age categories is somewhat interdependent, which implies that this data on job
creation can only be used to estimate the relative effect of bank competition on one group
with respect to the other.
There exists, however, an alternative format of the Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh’s data
set that is also publicly available. This data set has a coarser level of disaggregation, with
information available only over time and across census regions but aggregated across
industrial sectors. While lacking the industry dimension, this alternative data set has an
important advantage: that the rates of job creation and destruction are provided for three
different age categories: establishments up to one year old (observed only in current
year), those between 1 and 10 years old, and those older than 10 years.
5 Davis,
Haltiwanger and Schuh define the first group, again, as start-ups, the second one as
“middle-aged” establishments, and the third group as “mature” ones.
In addition to a finer level of detail on the age profile of industrial establishments, the
rates of job creation and destruction in this alternative data set are reported as actual
growth rates for each age category, rather than components of the total job creation rate
across categories. Thus, the first data set includes the third cross-industry dimension but
does not provide independent information on job creation rates between start-ups and the7
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complementary age group of the continuing establishments. The second data set lacks
this latter dimension but has superior information related to the age profile of
manufacturing establishments. Gathering evidence from both data sets should allow me
to draw as complete a picture as possible of the effect of bank competition on job creation
rates. Table 1 presents year averages for the rates of job creation and job destruction and
employment share for the three age categories of start-ups, middle-aged and mature
establishments.
The data on industry structure was matched with information from the FDIC Summary of
Deposits, from Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and from Compustat. From the Summary of
Deposits, I have calculated Herfindhal-Hirschmann indexes of market concentration,
measures of total bank assets and total bank loans for each of the nine census regions.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) used dummy variables to describe the process of banking
deregulation occurring across U.S. states. Both intrastate and interstate restrictions on
branching and on the creation of de novo banks existed to differing degrees in all U.S.
states in previous decades. This meant substantial restrictions to entry in local markets
and consequently a significant impact on the degree of banking competition. Starting in
the 1970’s states began a process of relaxing such restrictions that continued throughout
the early 1990’s. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) have shown that as a result of increased
competition, state economic growth accelerated after deregulation. Based on their
indicator variables constructed at the state level, I have constructed an equivalent
indicator for each region, using state income levels as weights, which captures the
process of relaxation of restrictions to interstate bank branching. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate
                                                                                                                                                                            
5 The classification of the age categories varies slightly over time. At one extreme, in some years the ranges
are less than two years old, two to eight and older than eight. At the other extreme, for some years the
ranges were less than three, three to twelve and older than twelve.8
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the time path of bank concentration and of the deregulation indicators constructed for the
nine regions.
Taking advantage of the availability, in the first data set, of information about
establishments from a cross-section of industrial sectors, I have augmented the
estimations according to the differences-in-differences approach first suggested by Rajan
and Zingales (1998). As these authors highlight, industrial sectors differ from one
another, for technological reasons, in terms of their degree of dependence on external
sources of finance. It must therefore be the case that whatever the effect of bank
concentration and bank deregulation on the life-cycle dynamics of a sector, this effect
must be especially strong for those sectors that rely more heavily on external finance for
their investment needs. For this reason, and following Rajan and Zingales, data on
external financial dependence for each two-digit sector was constructed using
information available in Compustat.
Since data from the Summary of Deposits was available only from 1977, the merged
data, in its most extensive format, runs from 1977 through 1988, with information for 9
regions and 20 manufacturing sectors.
Empirical testing
The detailed information on real economic activity for establishments in different age
categories permits testing hypotheses about the specific mechanisms through which bank
concentration and banking deregulation may impact the life-cycle dynamics of industrial
sectors. Evidently, industries’ employment dynamics, and what they imply in terms of
industry entry and exit, are the results of many more factors, possibly even of a higher
order of importance than the prevailing characteristics of the credit market. Such factors9
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may be specific to each industrial sector, or they may be common across sectors for firms
operating in a certain geographical area, or they may have a temporal component. The
richness of a data set with multiple dimensions makes it possible to identify the effect of
the bank competition variables, which vary across both region and time, while still
controlling with vectors of dummy variables for effects that are specific to a given
geographical region, related to time passing, or are industry specific (though these last
ones are controlled for in only one of the two data sets). This approach should
substantially reduce the risk of a bias in the estimations due to the omission of relevant
variables. As mentioned above, I also use information on the financial needs of each
industrial sector and, where possible, I augment the estimation of the effects of the bank
competition variables by using terms of interaction of such variables with the indicator of
external financial dependence constructed from Compustat data.
Details of the methodology are more easily understood by looking directly at the models
used for the estimation analysis. The basic strategy is to analyze the effect of the bank
competition variables on establishments in the different age groups. I begin by focusing
on the possible effect of bank competition on start-up plants. If bank market power
enhances credit access to the youngest firms, then we should find that, all else equal, the
rates of job creation of start-ups should be higher if bank concentration is higher and if
banks face tighter regulatory restrictions. The opposite is true if instead one argues that
banking market power may in fact represents a financial barrier to entry in product
markets.
Using the second data set, I first estimate the following model:10
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(2)
Job creation of start-ups Regional dummies Year dummies
Deregulation Bank concentration
Controls Error









where the dependent variable is the actual rate of job creation of start-up establishments
in region r and in year t. The vectors of indicator variables absorb region-specific and
time-specific effects. The deregulation and bank concentration variables contain both a
time and a geographic dimension and are therefore identifiable. If bank market power
enhances entry, then we should expect β to be negative and significant and  γ to be
positive and significant. The opposite is true under the more traditional hypothesis that
bank competition has a positive effect on the real economic activity of start-ups.
Subsequently, I look for confirmation of any result obtained with this first model
specification by using the richer three-dimensional panel. As explained above, since this
data set presents rates of job creation for start-ups and continuing establishments only as
components of the total job creation rate, I can only test how either job creation rates for
each age group contribute to the total. More precisely, I estimate the following alternative
model specification: 
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The dependent variable is the rate of job creation of start-ups in each industry s in region
r in year t  relative to the total job creation rate. Note that, necessarily, any effect
identified through this model specification implies a mirror image effect (of the same11
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magnitude but opposite sign) on mature establishments. The three vectors of indicator
variables absorb the sector-specific, region-specific and time-specific effects. As above,
the deregulation and bank concentration variables contain both time and geographic
dimensions and are therefore identifiable. As mentioned earlier, this data set may also be
exploited to disaggregate sector-specific characteristics, such as the needs for external
funding. Following the methodological approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998), whatever
the effect of the variables of bank competition, such an effect will be especially strong in
sectors that are relatively more dependent on external sources of finance. The interaction
terms with the external financial dependence variable capture these effects. If bank
market power enhances entry, then δ will be negative and significant and ϕ positive and
significant.
Next, I focus on what happens to start-ups once they receive funding and begin to grow.
Does bank competition help relative younger firms to thrive? To explore this issue I have
analyzed the effect of bank competition on the persistence rates of start-ups. The finer
details on age present in the second data set allow me to do that by looking at both the job
creation rates and the job destruction rates for the middle-aged establishments. These are
plants that in relatively recent times were start-ups but are not yet considered mature. The
analysis of this age group is performed using the following model specifications:
(4)
Job creation of middle-age establishments Regional dummies Year dummies
Deregulation Bank concentration
Controls Error











Job destruction of middle-age establishments Regional dummies Year dummies
Deregulation Bank concentration
Controls Error










Finally, I analyze the effect of bank competition on the mature establishments. Given the
dependence between the rates of job creation in the first data set, some indirect
information on the role of bank competition for continuing establishments comes from
the analysis of model (3). Similar analysis to those of models (1) and (4) can, however,
be replicated focusing on the job creation rates of the third cohort, that of the mature
establishments:
(6)
Job creation of mature establishments Regional dummies Year dummies
Deregulation Bank concentration
Controls Error








Similarly, I analyze the potential effect of bank competition on the persistence rates of
industry incumbents, thereby testing whether bank competition accelerates or slows down
industry exit. To this end, I estimate the following model specification:
(7)
Job destruction of mature establishments Regional dummies Year dummies r
Deregulation Bank concentration
Controls Error









This section presents the results obtained during this first exploration of the data set.
While the robustness of the results varies they are nevertheless quite consistent across the
various model specifications and allow us to form a coherent picture of the potential
effects of bank competition on the life-cycle dynamics of non-financial industries.13
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Effect on entry (start-ups)
Table 2 presents the results of regressions based on model specification (2). The
dependent variable is the actual growth rate of job creation among start-ups. As
mentioned earlier, this second data set is characterized by information across regions and
year only, but it has a finer level of detail on the age profile of establishments. Region
and year indicator variables are included in the regressions though their estimates are not
reported in the table. The regression results show that bank concentration is not
significant, while the bank deregulation variable is positive and significant (at the 10
percent level) in three out of four regressions. Employment share measures the relative
size of all start-up establishments in a given region and year. Bank size, total loans and
total loans per capita are additional controls for characteristics of the banking industry.
The results from this set of regressions offer a first indication that bank competition,
rather than bank market power, may provide better opportunity for entry in industrial
sectors. Additional evidence of the potential effects on industry entry is extrapolated
using the first data set. Table 3 displays regression results based on estimation of
specification (3). Recall that the dependent variable is the rate of job creation of start-up
establishments in sector s, region r and year t relative to the total rate of job creation in
each sector, region and year. With this dependent variable we can thus test if the
contribution of start-ups to the total job creation rate increases or decreases depending on
the competitive conditions in banking. Industry, region and year indicator variables are
included in the regressions though their estimates are not reported in the table. The results
in the different specifications of the model indicate a negative and significant effect of
bank concentration on the relative rate of job creation of start-ups. Consistent with this14
14
first result, the bank deregulation indicator is positive and significant (in two out of four
regressions) when interacted with external financial dependence. Both results thus
indicate that the job creation rates of start-ups become relatively more important for the
job creation rate of the industry as a whole as a result of improvements in bank
competition.
Taken  all together, the results from these first two models suggest that bank competition
plays a positive role for start-ups and that in fact bank market power may represent a
form of barrier to entry in non-financial sectors.
Persistence rates of start-ups
The next step in the analysis was to analyze the impact of bank competition on the
“persistence” rates of start-ups: once they are helped in the earliest stages of the life-
cycle, will the youngest establishments thrive under more or less competitive conditions
in the banking industry? The results displayed in Table 4 and 5 provide some indication
that if bank competition enhances industry entry, it also contributes to enhance their
likelihood of survival in the first years of the life cycle. While there is only tenuous
evidence, as indicated in Table 4, of a significant effect on the job creation of middle-
aged establishments, that is those at least two years old but not older than about ten, there
is stronger evidence, reported in Table 5, that the rate of job destruction among middle-
aged establishments is significantly lower in regions after states began the process of
banking deregulation. Hence, this second set of results suggests that bank competition
contributes to the success of newcomers. This is true at least in the sense that once they
pass the start-up stage there is a decreasing likelihood of shrinking and shutting down in
more competitive banking markets.15
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Expansion of incumbents
The results of model specification (2) already pointed out, indirectly, that bank
competition has a negative impact on the ability to expand for older establishments:
indeed, given the dependent variable in that model, any effect of bank competition on
start-ups would be equal but with an opposite sign for the older plants. We can look for
confirmation of the negative role of bank competition on the ability of incumbents to
expand using the second data set, where we can focus specifically on the job creation
rates of mature plants. The results of regressions from specification (6), as displayed in
Table 6, indicate that job creation rates of mature plants are indeed higher in markets
characterized by higher bank concentration. Hence, the continuing expansion of
establishments, once they reach a mature age and attain the status of industry incumbents,
seems to be enhanced by the presence of less competitive conditions in the banking
industry.
Persistence rates of incumbents
The evidence gathered so far suggests that bank competition has an overall positive effect
on the expansion and survival of younger establishments and a negative effect on the
expansion of mature ones. Table 7 shows evidence of the effect of bank competition on
the persistence rates of incumbents. The dependent variable is the rate of job destruction
of continuing establishments. The effect is picked up by the terms of interaction of bank
concentration and bank deregulation with external financial dependence. The first term is
negative and significant while the second one is positive and significant in all four
alternative model specifications. This result is confirmed, at least partially, from the16
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results presented in Table 8, based on the alternative data set. In two out of four
specifications, bank concentration is negative and significant. Taken together, these
results suggest that incumbent establishments do better in less competitive banking
markets.
Conclusions
This paper has explored a new dimension of the economic role of bank competition. The
empirical evidence shows that bank competition can have a significant impact on the
entire life-cycle dynamics of non-financial industries. Some caveats remain present at this
preliminary stage of analysis. For as much as the data sets on job flows are extremely
interesting, they still suffer from potentially relevant limitations in the width of the
available information. Gaining access to the data at higher levels of disaggregation would
certainly allow a more careful identification of the effects under study. The incorporation
of additional control variables would also permit a higher degree of reliability.
These reservations notwithstanding, the data suggest important trajectories for further
analysis. More competition in banking appears to promote job creation among industrial
establishments at the start-up stage and to permit them to prosper in the immediate wake
of their entry into the market. At the same time, more bank competition accelerates the
exit of more mature establishments from the market. These results are consistent with
theories suggesting that banking market power may represent a financial barrier to entry
in product markets.
Another way to express the results is to say that bank competition has an effect on the age
distribution of establishments within an industry. Let us refer to the statistics reported in
Table 1, which describe job flows and employment share for each of the three age17
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categories of industrial establishments over the period under analysis (1977-1988). It is a
stylized fact that, as the table indicates, on average start-ups have the highest rates of job
creation and mature establishments the lowest, but the relative size of start-ups is very
small with respect to older establishments. The results of the paper suggest that changes
in bank competition may modify such distributions in non-financial sectors. More
precisely, increases in bank competition should be associated with a shift of mass in the
age distribution of job flows and size toward the younger establishments.
Much theoretical and empirical work has analyzed the relationship between
establishments’ age and job flows and, more generally, the determinants of the industrial
life cycle.
6 This paper makes a contribution to this literature by arguing that certain
characteristics of the credit market, namely its degree of competition, constitute one such
determinant. It is worth exploring further what the findings of this analysis imply about
the broad relationship of bank competition to industry structure, though here I will simply
mention two possible implications. First, if concentration of market power in banking
creates a barrier to entry in other industries, then we are suggesting that bank competition
has a potential impact on the competitive conduct of non-financial markets. In addition,
banking markets’ role in delaying or accelerating processes of industry entry and exit
may in turn be expected to impact the pace of adoption of technological innovations in
industrial sectors. Thus, the dynamics explored in this analysis may ultimately have
implications for economic growth.
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Jovanovic, (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Evans (1987), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989)
and Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).18
18
Bibliography
BLACK, SANDRA AND PHILIP  STRAHAN, “Entrepreneurship and the Structure of the
Banking Industry”, Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
BONACCORSI DI PATTI, ENRICA AND GIOVANNI DELL’ARICCIA, “Bank Competition and
Firm Creation”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Forthcoming.
BRANDER, JAMES AND TRACY LEWIS, “Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited
Liability Effect”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 5. (Dec., 1986),
pp. 956-970.
CESTONE, GIACINTA AND LUCY WHITE, “Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The
Design of Financial Claims”, Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
CETORELLI, NICOLA, “Does Bank Concentration Lead to Concentration in Industrial
Sectors?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, WP 2001-01
CETORELLI, NICOLA AND MICHELE  GAMBERA, “Banking Market Structure, Financial
Dependence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data”, Journal of
Finance, (April 2001), 56, 2, 617-648.
CETORELLI, NICOLA AND PHILIP STRAHAN, “Banking Competition, Technology and the
Structure of Industry”, Mimeo, 2002
CHEVALIER, JUDITH A., “Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical
Evidence from the Supermarket Industry”, The American Economic Review, Vol.
85, No. 3. (Jun., 1995), pp. 415-435.
DAVIS, STEVEN J. AND JOHN HALTIWANGER, “Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction,
and Employment Reallocation”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107,
No. 3. (Aug., 1992), pp. 819-863.
DAVIS, STEVEN J., JOHN HALTIWANGER AND SCOTT SCHUH, Job creation and destruction,
The MIT Press, (1996).
DUNNE, TIMOTHY, MARK J. ROBERTS, LARRY SAMUELSON, “The Growth and Failure of
U.S. Manufacturing Plants”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No.
4. (Nov., 1989), pp. 671-698.
EVANS, DAVID S., “The Relationship Between Firm Growth, Size, and Age: Estimates for
100 Manufacturing Industries (in Competition in the Long Run)”, Journal of19
19
Industrial Economics, Vol. 35, No. 4, The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial
Economics. (June, 1987), pp. 567-581.
HOPENHAYN, HUGO A., “Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium”,
Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 5. (Sep., 1992), pp. 1127-1150.
JAYARATNE, JITH AND PHILIP STRAHAN, “The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from
Bank Branching Deregulation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), (1996),
639-70.
JOVANOVIC, BOYAN, “Selection and the Evolution of Industry”, Econometrica, Vol. 50,
No. 3. (May, 1982), pp. 649-670.
KOVENOCK, DAN AND GORDON  M. PHILLIPS, “Capital Structure and Product Market
Behaviour: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions”, The Review
of Financial Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 767-803.
KOVENOCK, DAN AND GORDON  M. PHILLIPS, “Capital Structure and Product-Market
Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory and Evidence?” The American Economic
Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings, (May, 1995), pp. 403-408.
MAKSIMOVIC, VOJISLAV, “Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies”, The RAND
Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Autumn, 1988), pp. 389-407.
PETERSEN, MITCHELL  A.  AND  RAGHURAM  G. RAJAN, “The Effect of Credit Market
Competition on Lending Relationships”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 110, No. 2. (May, 1995), pp. 407-443.
RAJAN, RAGHURAM  G.,  AND  LUIGI  ZINGALES, “Financial Dependence and Growth,”
American Economic Review 88(3), (1998), 559–586.
SPAGNOLO, GIANCARLO, “Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device”, SSE Ec.&Fin. W.P.
No. 243, (2001)20
20


























































2145.89TABLE 1: JOB FLOWS BY ESTABLISHMENT AGE
Job creation Job destruction Employment share
Age categories
start-ups 48.7 11.0 2.7
middle-aged 12.2 13.7 17.5
mature 7.09 9.30 79.7
Start-ups are establishments up to one year old, middle-aged establishments are those between 1 and 10
years old, and mature establishments are more than 10 years old. The statistics are averages across regions
and industrial sectors for the period 1977-1988.TABLE 2: THE EFFECT OF BANK COMPETITION ON START-UPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank concentrationrt -97.279 -191.597 -136.169 -93.899
(136.514) (158.453) (138.778) (138.366)
Bank deregulationrt 10.480* 8.424 11.423* 10.600*
(6.425) (6.500) (6.230) (6.468)
Employment sharert -27.673*** -30.153*** -37.041*** -28.167***





Total loans per capitart -4.518
(15.610)
Observations 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.82
The dependent variable is the rate of job creation of start-ups in each region r and year t. Start-ups are defined as one year old plants. The time period is 1977-1988. Bank
concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index calculated on bank deposits, aggregated across markets in each of the nine census regions r over time. Bank deregulation is an
indicator variable capturing the process of relaxation of bank entry restrictions in each region r over time. Employment share measures the relative size of all start-up plants in
region r and year t. Bank size is an aggregate of bank total assets for banks in region r and year t. Total loans size is an aggregate of bank total loans for banks in region r and year
t. Total loans per capita is total loans divided by total region population. Region and year dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not
reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%TABLE 3: THE EFFECT OF BANK COMPETITION ON START-UPS (RELATIVE EFFECT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank concentrationrt -0.740** -1.367*** -0.909*** -0.757**
(0.328) (0.382) (0.339) (0.330)
Bank deregulationrt 0.005 -0.013 0.011 -0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Bank concentrationrt · External dependences -0.044 -0.047 -0.057 -0.119
(0.141) (0.140) (0.150) (0.157)
Bank deregulationrt · External dependences 0.023* 0.027* 0.024* 0.026*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Employment sharerst -0.010* -0.010* -0.010** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bank sizert 0.070***
(0.018)




Total loansrt · External dependences -0.0002
(0.0004)
Total loans per capitart 0.087*
(0.052)
Total loans per capitart · External dependences -0.042
(0.029)
Observations 2157 2157 2157 2157
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
The dependent variable is the rate of job creation of start-ups in each region r, sector s, year t relative to total job creation, that is, the sum of job creation rates for start-ups and
continuing establishments in each region r, sector s, year t. Start-ups are defined as one year old plants. The time period is 1977-1988. Bank concentration is the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index calculated on bank deposits, aggregated across markets in each of the nine census regions r over time. Bank deregulation is an indicator variable capturing the
process of relaxation of bank entry restrictions in each region r over time. External dependence measures for each sector s the degree of financial dependence on external sources
of funding. Employment share measures the relative size of all plants in region r and year t. Bank size is an aggregate of bank total assets for banks in region r and year t. Total
loans size is an aggregate of bank total loans for banks in region r and year t. Total loans per capita is total loans divided by total region population. Region, industry and year
dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%TABLE 4: THE EFFECT OF BANK COMPETITION ON THE PERSISTENCE RATES OF START-UPS.
EFFECT ON JOB CREATION RATES OF “MIDDLE-AGED” ESTABLISHMENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank concentrationrt -4.704 -44.565* -13.334 -3.213
(23.205) (27.002) (23.163) (23.540)
Bank deregulationrt 0.252 -0.614 0.224 0.312
(0.910) (0.867) (0.907) (0.911)
Employment sharert -0.824 -0.792 -1.247 -0.796





Total loans per capitart -2.185
(2.855)
Observations 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.63 0.67 0.64 0.63
The dependent variable is the rate of job creation of “middle-aged” establishments in each region r and year t. Middle-aged establishments are defined as plants between 2 and 10
years old. The time period is 1977-1988. Bank concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index calculated on bank deposits, aggregated across markets in each of the nine
census regions r over time. Bank deregulation is an indicator variable capturing the process of relaxation of bank entry restrictions in each region r over time. Employment share
measures the relative size of all plants in the middle-aged group in region r and year t. Bank size is an aggregate of bank total assets for banks in region r and year t. Total loans
size is an aggregate of bank total loans for banks in region r and year t. Total loans per capita is total loans divided by total region population. Region and year dummy variables
are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%TABLE 5: THE EFFECT OF BANK COMPETITION ON THE PERSISTENCE RATES OF START-
UPS. EFFECT ON JOB DESTRUCTION RATES OF “MIDDLE-AGED” ESTABLISHMENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank concentrationrt -7.883 -0.643 0.631 -13.023
(25.459) (34.921) (26.384) (25.490)
Bank deregulationrt -2.748** -2.602** -2.868** -2.911**
(1.172) (1.238) (1.181) (1.170)
Employment sharert 0.136 0.159 0.225 0.098





Total loans per capitart 7.113
(4.909)
Observations 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
The dependent variable is the rate of job destruction of “middle-aged” establishments in each region r and year t. Middle-aged
establishments are defined as plants between 2 and 10 years old. The time period is 1977-1988. Bank concentration is the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index calculated on bank deposits, aggregated across markets in each of the nine census regions r over
time. Bank deregulation is an indicator variable capturing the process of relaxation of bank entry restrictions in each region r over
time. Employment share measures the relative size of all plants in the middle-aged group in region r and year t. Bank size is an
aggregate of bank total assets for banks in region r and year t. Total loans size is an aggregate of bank total loans for banks in
region r and year t. Total loans per capita is total loans divided by total region population. Region and year dummy variables are
included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%TABLE  6 : THE EFFECT OF BANK COMPETITION ON INCUMBENTS’
EXPANSION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pos3 pos3 pos3 pos3
Bank concentrationrt 22.086** 10.433 21.393** 23.907***
(9.056) (11.416) (9.604) (8.393)
Bank deregulationrt 0.389 0.154 0.399 0.447
(0.365) (0.386) (0.365) (0.355)
Employment sharert -0.050 -0.087 -0.057 -0.037





Total loans per capitart -2.520*
(1.321)
Observations 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
The dependent variable is the rate of job creation of mature establishments in each region r and year t. Mature
establishments are defined as plants more than 10 years old. The time period is 1977-1988. Bank concentration is the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index calculated on bank deposits, aggregated across markets in each of the nine census
regions r over time. Bank deregulation is an indicator variable capturing the process of relaxation of bank entry
restrictions in each region r over time. Employment share measures the relative size of all mature plants in region r
and year t. Bank size is an aggregate of bank total assets for banks in region r and year t. Total loans size is an
aggregate of bank total loans for banks in region r and year t. Total loans per capita is total loans divided by total
region population. Region and year dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are
not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%TABLE 7: THE EFFECT OF BANK COMPETITION ON INCUMBENTS PERSISTENCE RATES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank concentrationrt 1.826 3.803 2.996 1.499
(5.548) (6.997) (5.656) (5.586)
Bank deregulationrt -0.228 -0.176 -0.280 -0.277
(0.231) (0.231) (0.234) (0.231)
Bank concentrationrt · External dependences -5.659** -5.670** -6.439*** -5.842**
(2.381) (2.389) (2.463) (2.700)
Bank deregulationrt · External dependences 0.526** 0.539** 0.591** 0.535**
(0.220) (0.226) (0.231) (0.229)
Total job destructionrst 0.612*** 0.612*** 0.611*** 0.612***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Bank sizert -0.204
(0.336)




Total loansrt · External dependences -0.002
(0.001)
Total loans per capitart 0.731
(0.811)
Total loans per capitart · External dependences -0.103
(0.436)
Observations 2157 2157 2157 2157
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
The dependent variable is the rate of job destruction of continuing establishments in each region r, sector s, year t. Continuing
establishments are defined as a complementary age group to start-ups. The time period is 1977-1988. Bank concentration is the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index calculated on bank deposits, aggregated across markets in each of the nine census regions r over time.
Bank deregulation is an indicator variable capturing the process of relaxation of bank entry restrictions in each region r over time.
External dependence measures for each sector s the degree of financial dependence on external sources of funding. Total job destruction
is the sum of job destruction rates for establishments shutting down and establishments surviving in each region r, sector s, year t. Bank
size is an aggregate of bank total assets for banks in region r and year t. Total loans size is an aggregate of bank total loans for banks in
region r and year t. Total loans per capita is total loans divided by total region population. Region, industry and year dummy variables
are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%TABLE 8: MORE ON THE EFFECT OF BANK COMPETITION ON INCUMBENTS’ PERSISTENCE
RATES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank concentrationrt -23.266* -25.994 -17.483 -29.076**
(13.645) (17.462) (14.569) (11.546)
Bank deregulationrt -0.238 -0.293 -0.319 -0.422
(0.625) (0.653) (0.628) (0.582)
Employment sharert -0.264 -0.273 -0.203 -0.307





Total loans per capitart 8.041**
(3.611)
Observations 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85
The dependent variable is the rate of job destruction of mature establishments in each region r and year t. Mature establishments are
defined as plants more than 10 years old. The time period is 1977-1988. Bank concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index
calculated on bank deposits, aggregated across markets in each of the nine census regions r over time. Bank deregulation is an indicator
variable capturing the process of relaxation of bank entry restrictions in each region r over time. Employment share measures the relative
size of all mature plants in region r and year t. Bank size is an aggregate of bank total assets for banks in region r and year t. Total loans
size is an aggregate of bank total loans for banks in region r and year t. Total loans per capita is total loans divided by total region
population. Region and year dummy variables are included in all regressions but the coefficient estimates are not reported. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%1
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